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I have one complaint, which is that Woodward’s subtitle misleads: “a theory of 
causal explanation” names just one part of what this excellent book contains. You 
will also find detailed, illuminating discussions of causation, laws of nature, events, 
the theory of confirmation, and the nature of good philosophical methodology, to 
name just the most prominent topics. The level of philosophical acuity is uniformly 
high, and Woodward’s command of and ability to engage with a wide range of both 
philosophical and scientific material is extremely impressive. A must-read, then—and 
not just for philosophers of science and metaphysicians. Biased though I am, I still 
do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the quality of science education at the 
college level would improve significantly if every statistics course incorporated this 
book as required reading (or at least chapters 1 - 3, and chapter 7). 
Here is a sketch of the ideas that lie at the heart of Woodward’s approach to 
causation  and  explanation.  Suppose  you  want  to  understand  some  system—an 
economy, or a machine, or a living organism, or a chemical reaction, what have you. 
Then scientific inquiry will give you such understanding by showing you how to 
describe  the  interacting  parts  of  the  system  by  means  of  variables  whose  values 
represent  different  possible  states  of  those  parts,  and  by  means  of  “structural 
equations”  which  capture  the  relations  of  immediate  dependency  between  these 
variables.   Here are some illustrative examples, of a kind quite familiar from the contempo-
rary causation literature. The following two illustrations depict distinct systems of 
interacting “neurons”. These neurons are much simpler than the real thing: all they 
can do is either fire or not fire, and the connections between them come in just two 
flavors, stimulatory (represented by a normal arrow), or inhibitory (represented by a 
line with a blob at the end). Shading indicates that the neuron fires, and the order of 
events is left-to-right.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Thus in figure 1, neurons A and C fire simultaneously (at time 0, say). At time 1, neu-
ron D fires as a result of the stimulatory signal from C; at time 2, E fires as a result 
of the signal from D. B, although stimulated by A, also receives an inhibitory signal 
from C, and so does not fire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
Similarly, in figure 2 neuron C fires, stimulating both B and D to fire. But the inhibi-
tory signal from D cancels the stimulatory signal from B, so E does not fire. 
Choosing variables and structural equations for these systems is trivial. In each 
case, we assign a binary variable to each neuron that takes the value one if that neu-
ron fires and zero if it remains dormant. For figure 1, we have these equations: 
 
E = B + D – BD 
D = C 
B = A(1 – C) 
 
And for figure 2, we have these equations: 
 
E = B(1 – D) 
D = C 
B = C 
 
We will draw some specific lessons from these examples later on. For now, we 
can use them to illustrate some general features of Woodward’s scheme. First, it is 
not the business of structural equations to describe merely de facto relationships be-
tween the values of variables (in a given kind of system, as it might be). Rather, they 
are intended to capture a certain kind of modal structure that the system manifests, 
consisting, roughly, in the facts about what the values of certain variables would have 
been if others had been set to certain values by a certain kind of “intervention”. 
Thus, the second equation for figure 1 tells us that the value for variable D counter-
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C  D
B   Review: Making Things Happen   
  3 
factually depends on the value of C, and C alone. This dependence is asymmetric—
C does not likewise depend on D—and is to be understood in such a way as to rule 
out “backtracking”—so that we are not allowed to say that if the value of B had 
been different, then that would have been because the value of C was different, and 
so the value of D would have been different as well. Woodward’s technical notion of 
“intervention” is designed to help make precise the particular kind of counterfactual 
dependence that is at issue here. (It is also, it is worth noting, a pretty good regimen-
tation of the ordinary notion of intervention.) 
It’s worth pausing to see how, given a certain system of structural equations, we 
can provide truth-conditions for a certain kind of conditional construction. Specifi-
cally, if we wish to evaluate 
If X = v, then P 
where X is some variable, v some possible value for it, and P some claim whose 
truth will be determined by the distribution of values for variables in whatever model 
(viz., system of variables-cum-structural equations) we are using, then we must first 
distinguish those variables in the model that depend (either immediately or medi-
ately) on X from those that don’t. In evaluating the given conditional, the latter vari-
ables have their values held fixed at whatever they actually are; only the values of the 
former are updated in accordance with the structural equations. The total set of val-
ues that results then determines the truth of P, and so the truth of the conditional. It 
is conditionals like this that, at least to a close approximation, capture the notion of 
what would happen as a result of an “intervention” on X. (“To a close approxima-
tion”, because Woodward’s official theory of interventions is a bit more complicated, 
for reasons that, though sound, we can afford to overlook.) Notice that this no-
tion—so far,  at  least—appears  to be model-relative.  We’ll  come  back  to this  point 
shortly. 
Second, Woodward shows how to use systems of structural equations to define a 
number of interesting type-level causal relations among variables, as well as a token-
level relation of “actual causation” between events (conceived of, roughly, as the in-
stantiation of a particular valuable value by particular variable on a particular occa-
sion; note that actual causation corresponds most closely to the relation that the 
mainstream literature on causation takes as its target of analysis). Thus, in the system 
depicted in figure 1, the variable D is a “direct cause” of variable E, while C is not a 
direct cause of E, but is a “total cause”. In addition, in figure 1, the firing of neuron 
C counts as an actual cause of the firing of neuron E (translated, C=1 is an actual 
cause of E=1).   Review: Making Things Happen   
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Third, Woodward argues quite persuasively that the explanatory value of a given 
system of structural equations hinges crucially on the degree to which the relation-
ships represented by these equations exhibit what he calls “invariance”. Roughly, in-
variance consists in stability under various possible counterfactual perturbations of 
the system and its environment. It is of the first importance that these relationships 
remain stable under counterfactual variations in the values of the constituent vari-
ables; without this much invariance we have no explanatory power at all. But it is 
also  important  how  stable  they  remain  under  perturbations  of  the  environment; 
structural equations that describe dependency relations that are themselves too easily 
disrupted by alterations in the environment will be of little scientific interest. (Imag-
ine that it was only in highly specific circumstances, difficult to produce and difficult 
to maintain, that the neurons in figure 1 would exhibit the relationships captured by 
the structural equations for that system; if so, we would naturally look for a much 
more encompassing system of variables plus structural equations—one much less 
susceptible  to  environmental  disruption—in  order  to  understand  their  behavior.) 
Woodward argues, again quite incisively, that it is the search for invariant relation-
ships that drives scientific inquiry more than the search for “laws of nature”. 
Finally, Woodward offers a simple but compelling back story to address ques-
tions all too often overlooked in the philosophical literature on causation and expla-
nation. Why is it that we come equipped with the causal and explanatory concepts 
we do? What is their value to us? Certain views on causation can look downright bi-
zarre when confronted with these questions. For example, consider Lewis’s counter-
factual analysis of causation, together with his unwieldy prescription, based on the 
notion of “miracles”, for evaluating counterfactuals. Woodward, building on criti-
cisms of Horwich and others, makes what I think is a rather devastating case that our 
allegiance to this particular causal concept—that is, one understood in terms of the 
peculiar Lewisian recipe for evaluating counterfactuals—should seem wholly arbi-
trary. By contrast, Woodward offers up an account of our causal and explanatory 
concepts as having the structure they do because, fundamentally, we are agents with 
an interest in manipulating the world around us. It is not that these concepts are 
somehow subjective. No, they are concepts of perfectly objective dependency rela-
tionships that exist in the world, and in particular Woodward is quite clear that he 
has no interest in reducing the concept of causation to some concept of human 
agency. His point is more subtle: if we wish to understand why, among all the possi-
ble objective relationships we might have latched on to, these ones hold such pride 
of place in our conceptual repertoire, we can do so by seeing how conceiving of the 
world in terms of them contributes to our aims as agents with an interest in manipu-
lating our surroundings.   Review: Making Things Happen   
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So much by way of overview. Let me turn now to what I think are two of the 
more important criticisms of Woodward’s approach—or perhaps better, to two of 
the more important bits of business left unfinished by what he offers us.  
The first issue concerns the pair of foundational questions: what are variables? 
And what are the truth conditions for structural equations relating them? Now, while 
it is certainly the case that, in working through Woodward’s book, one develops an 
excellent feel for how to answer these questions in particular cases, there’s very little 
Woodward says that explicitly addresses them. (He is not alone in this. The literature 
on structural equations tends to be quite relaxed in its attitude towards these ques-
tions.) Woodward is perfectly forthright that he does not intend to give any sort of 
reductive analysis of structural equations, pointing out that the account he gives of 
them in terms of the notion of intervention is circular, in so far as the notion of in-
tervention is itself a causal one, to be elucidated by appeal to structural equations 
themselves. This seems not to bother him, in part because the circle in question is far 
from  unilluminating.  For  the  interrelationships  Woodward  displays  between  the 
various bits of his apparatus unquestionably introduce substantive constraints. But in 
addition, Woodward is skeptical of the possibility of any kind of reductive account of 
causation, and more specifically of any kind of reductive account of the dependency 
relations that structural equations aim to capture. 
But I think his skepticism is a bit hasty, and more importantly that there are good 
practical and theoretical reasons for pursuing these two foundational questions in 
depth. To see what they are, let’s first explore what an answer to them might look 
like. 
Neuron diagrams are easy to model, in large part because it is so easy to choose 
variables for them: For each neuron, and each relevant time-interval (roughly: each 
time interval such that that neuron could, in the circumstances, do something inter-
esting in that time-interval), we introduce a variable to correspond to the state of that 
neuron during that interval. Typically, two values will suffice, one for “firing” and 
one for “not firing”. But we can easily add values, if we wish to distinguish different 
ways the neurons can fire.  
All of this suggests a more general prescription for choosing variables and values, 
for an arbitrary system we might wish to model: First, find a way to “carve up” the 
system into discrete, well-defined sub-systems. Second, for each relevant sub-system, 
and each relevant time or time-interval, introduce a variable to characterize the in-
trinsic physical state of that sub-system at that time, or during that time-interval. 
I used “relevant” twice, partly because not every sub-system needs explicit repre-
sentation (for example, one need not bother with variables corresponding to the 
stimulatory and inhibitory channels between neurons), and partly because not every   Review: Making Things Happen   
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moment of time is such that the behavior of the system at that time needs represent-
ing (for example, one also need not bother with variables that characterize the state 
of neurons before or after the events under consideration, or during the passage of 
signals). 
In addition, it may not always be straightforward how to “carve up” the given 
system into sub-systems. It will be fairly straightforward, if the system is constituted 
by a number of clearly distinguishable, interacting parts. But that won’t always be the 
case—at least, at the desired level of description. Consider the flow of water down 
some rapids: what choice could we make of interacting parts, given that we don’t 
wish to introduce variables for the state of each water molecule at each moment? 
Here a kind of default option suggests itself, which is that we choose variables to 
correspond to reasonably well-defined regions of space at different times, or regions of 
spacetime. The price of exercising this option is, in general, that no set of variables 
will stand out as uniquely appropriate.  
Patently, what I’ve offered is far very from an exact recipe for determining the 
variables and values appropriate for modeling any given situation. But that is perhaps 
as it should be: within broad but non-trivial constraints, many choices are permissi-
ble. Still, my approach differs substantially from Woodward’s own. Consider a sam-
ple passage: 
 
Intuitively, variables are properties or magnitudes that, as the name implies, are ca-
pable of taking more than one value.… Many of the familiar examples of so-called 
property causation discussed in the philosophical literature may be understood as 
relationships between two-valued or binary variables, with the variable in question 
taking one of two values, depending on whether the properties in question are in-
stantiated or not. Thus, the claim that ingestion of aspirin causes recovery from 
headache may be understood as asserting a relationship between the values of a 
variable A, representing whether or not aspirin is ingested, and the values of a vari-
able H, representing whether of not relief from headache occurs. (p. 39) 
 
Variables, for Woodward, are thus type-level entities, whose job is not, in the first in-
stance, to characterize the state of a localized bit of the world at a specific time. By 
contrast, I suggest that we think of variables precisely as vehicles for spatiotempo-
rally localized representation of the world. An advantage of doing so will emerge 
shortly, in the form of a relatively clean account of what it is for a structural equation 
to relate some variable. 
Okay, suppose we’ve chosen our variables for some system of interest. What are 
the truth-conditions for structural equations? What is it for such-and-such structural 
equations to correctly relate these variables? Woodward doesn’t say, and it seems   Review: Making Things Happen   
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clear that much of his tolerance for the lack of a clear, reductive account of the 
truth-conditions for structural equations comes from the impression that there are 
no adequate alternatives to treating the notion as a kind of primitive, and using it to 
analyze the counterfactuals that will provide the ingredients for an account of causa-
tion and explanation. Now, to the extent that one thinks of Lewis’s “miracles”-based 
account as providing the main or perhaps only alternative, this impression is entirely 
understandable. Indeed, Woodward does a thorough and brilliant job of showing 
that that account is baroque, poorly motivated, and fails even on its own terms. But 
there is a much better account, which builds on a proposal of Tim Maudlin’s. It will 
work quite nicely to provide truth-conditions for structural equations, provided the 
modest strictures on choice of variables discussed above are adhered to. To see how 
it works, and how it can be adapted to the needs of causal modeling, let’s begin with 
a simple example. 
At  noon,  Suzy  throws  a  rock  at a window.  A  few  second later,  the  window 
breaks. Let C be her throw, E the breaking of the window. We seek truth-conditions 
for the conditional “if C had not occurred, then P”, where P can be any claim about 
the post-C history of the world (e.g., “E does not occur”). So consider the state of 
the world—the complete, fundamental physical state of the world—at the time at 
which C occurs. Consider a nomologically possible alternative to this physical state, 
which is just like it except that C does not occur. (Think of arriving at this state as 
follows: Begin with the actual state. Make localized changes to it—localized, that is, 
to the place or physical systems involved in C’s occurrence—sufficient to guarantee 
C’s non-occurrence.) The actual, fundamental physical laws proscribe a certain for-
ward evolution for this physical state. If that forward evolution is such as to make it 
the case that P, then the conditional is true; if it is such as to make it the case that 
not-P, then the conditional is false. In the given example, we begin with an alterna-
tive state that is just like the actual state, save that Suzy doesn’t throw. Forward evo-
lution: the window doesn’t break. In this way we secure the intuitively correct value 
true for “if Suzy hadn’t thrown, the window would not have broken”. 
We can also use this recipe to evaluate conditionals of the form “if C had oc-
curred in such-and-such a manner, then P”: Begin with the actual state of the world 
at the time of C’s occurrence. Make localized changes, sufficient to make C occur in 
the specified way. Evolve the resulting state forward, in accordance with the actual 
fundamental laws. Check to see whether P comes true. Shortly, this version of the 
recipe will prove useful, in given systematic truth-conditions for structural equations. 
A number of comments, before we proceed to that task. 
First, these truth-conditions for counterfactuals don’t yet take proper account of 
indeterminism,  of  either  the  fundamental  stochastic  variety  or  the  statistical  me-  Review: Making Things Happen   
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chanical variety. Nor do they take account of the relativistic prohibition on talk of 
states-at-times. We’ll ignore these issues here.  
Second, it’s worth emphasizing that this account breaks sharply with philosophi-
cal tradition, in that it does not give a semantics for counterfactuals in terms of simi-
larity between possible worlds but rather in terms of similarity between possible complete 
physical states of worlds. A smart move: much of what is so baroque about Lewis’s 
account, for example, flows from his insistence on defining a similarity relation be-
tween whole worlds. Note, in addition, that not much is required here of the notion 
of “similarity”: what we need, ultimately, is just a well-defined sense in which one 
complete physical state can be exactly the same as another, except in a certain speci-
fied respect that concerns a localized region or physical system. 
Third, we should not think that when we modify this localized region or physical 
system so as to make some actual event C fail to occur, we try to find an alternative 
state for this patch of the world that is as similar as possible to its actual state, consis-
tent with the requirement that C not occur. That will lead to silly deliberations like 
the following: “Well, in the counterfactual situation in which Suzy’s throw does not 
occur, what happens instead? Does she perhaps toss it? But then how do we know 
that such a tossing is not numerically identical to the actual throw?” A much better 
view is that for any given event, we work with an antecedently understood distinc-
tion between a default state for the region in which the event occurs, or for the physi-
cal system or systems to which it pertains. Conceiving of the event as one among 
various possible deviations from that default state, we answer the question, “What 
would have happened, had that event not occurred?” by returning the relevant region 
or system to its default state, holding the state of everything else fixed. In the case of 
Suzy, what we naturally think is that if she had not thrown the rock, what she would 
have been doing instead is standing there idly—doing nothing, as it were. Likewise, if we 
ask what would have happened, had a given neuron-firing not occurred, we naturally 
focus on an alternative situation in which that neuron remains, at the time in ques-
tion, in its dormant state—not a situation in which it fires in a different manner. 
Fourth, it is not really to be hoped that—even with a default state specified—the 
recipe will yield a unique counterfactual state of the world. Here, multiple realization 
reigns, and we should correspondingly expect limits on what we can say about any 
given counterfactual situation. If Suzy’s throw hadn’t occurred, the window wouldn’t 
have broken. –Not just then, at least. Would it have remained unbroken for the next 
year? We don’t know, of course, and not because it’s too hard to find out! 
Fifth, the recipe is quite limited in scope. It says nothing about conditionals such 
as the following: “If gravity had obeyed an inverse-cube law, Kepler’s second law still 
would have held.” (True, by the way.) Nor is it built to handle “backwards” condi-  Review: Making Things Happen   
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tionals, in which the consequent concerns a time or times before the time or times that 
the antecedent is about. Neither limitation poses a problem, given the purposes to 
which we will put the recipe; the second, in fact, is exactly what allows us to avoid 
talk of “miracles” (for we simply don’t care how the world managed to get into the 
counterfactual state specified in the antecedent).  
Time to consider how to arrive at structural equations. We’ll start with a simple 
idea, spot the need for an amendment, and refine accordingly. 
As an illustration, suppose we have some situation for which we wish to provide 
a causal model, and suppose we’ve decided that this model should make use of five 
variables: C1, C2, D1, D2, and E. Respecting the strictures laid out above, we have 
chosen these  variables  in  such a  way  that  each has  a well-defined  time  or  time-
interval associated with it. Let’s suppose that C1 and C2 concern the same time, as 
do D1 and D2; let’s suppose further that the temporal order among the five variables 
is this: C1, C2 < D1, D2 < E. Then a simple approach is to stipulate that the equa-
tions for D1 and D2 shall include only C1 and C2, and that the equation for E shall 
include only D1 and D2. The Maudlin-recipe applies straightforwardly. To fix an 
equation for D1, for example, we need to determine, for each setting of the C-
variables C1 = v1 and C2 = v2, a resulting value for D1. Begin with the state of the 
world at the time the C-variables concern. Modify it locally so as to make C1 = v1 
and C2 = v2. Evolve the resulting state forward in accordance with the actual fun-
damental laws. The value for D1 will be that unique value w such that the proposi-
tion D1 = w is guaranteed to be true, given this forward evolution. Don’t be fooled, 
of course, by the heuristic talk of “modifying” and “evolving” (as if complete physi-
cal states were something we could manipulate). When cleansed of such talk, it’s ap-
parent that what we have provided here is a purely metaphysical story about what 
makes a given structural equation correct. 
(What if there is no such unique value? Well, there won’t be more than one; the 
worry is that there might not be any. If so, that shows that there was something 
wrong  with  our  choice  of  variables—e.g.,  C1  and/or  C2  weren’t  “fine-grained” 
enough, or D1 and/or D2 were too fine-grained. Then we should simply fix the prob-
lem, and move on.) 
This account of the truth-conditions for structural equations almost works. But 
there is a problem, one that arises if we are, as it were, too parsimonious in our 
choice of variables. Consider figure 1 again. Suppose we simply omit the variables A 
and B, choosing to construct a model using only C, D, and E. Then the account just 
given will yield these structural equations:   Review: Making Things Happen   
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E = D 
D = C 
There’s no problem with the second, nor—in a certain sense—with the first; that is, 
the first correctly captures the way that E immediately depends on D. But put them 
together in a single causal model, and that model will tell us that the conditional 
if C = 0, then E = 0 
is true. And that is because, according to the model, an intervention on C that sets its 
value to 0 will have the effect (given the second equation) of setting the value of D 
to 0, which will in turn have the effect (given the first equation) of setting the value 
of E to 0. So the model fails to return the truth-value for the conditional “if C = 0, 
then E = 0” that we evaluate using the Maudlin-recipe. The latter conditional is 
straightforwardly false—false full stop, and not merely relative to this or that model. 
Perhaps we should rest content with the position that the former conditional can be 
true relative to some models (e.g., this one), and false relative to others (e.g., the 
more complete model of figure 1 provided earlier). Woodward does not, as far as I 
can tell, explicitly endorse this position, though other authors have (e.g., Halpern & 
Pearl). 
But that would be a mistake, a move that would shift too much of the burden of 
providing  an  adequate  structural  equations  account  of  causation  and  explanation 
onto the project of producing the as-yet unwritten rules for choosing “appropriate” 
causal models. It’s much better to lay down rules that guarantee a certain kind of 
stability in our causal models, so that a conditional like the foregoing one will receive 
the same truth-value relative to every model that assigns it one. There is a natural 
way to achieve this effect, one with the added benefit of guaranteeing that this truth-
value will match the one yielded by the Maudlin-recipe. 
Return to figure 1, and our overly parsimonious model for it that used only vari-
ables C, D, and E. The trouble we got into with this model derived from the fact 
that, in the counterfactual situation in which C has the value 0, one consequence of its 
having this value is that neuron B fires, which in turn guarantees that E fires. But our 
paired-down model contains no variable whose value could reflect the fact that B 
fires. One bad solution to this problem is to insist that an acceptable model contain a 
comprehensive enough set of variables, so that any relevant consequence of one 
variable’s having a given value gets explicit representation in the values of other vari-
ables. I think that places too high a demand on the causal modeler, and at any rate 
there is a cleaner approach. To illustrate, I’ll stick to this three-variable model for 
figure 1.   Review: Making Things Happen   
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The temporal order of the variables is C < D < E. In writing down equations 
for these variables, we adopt the policy that for a given variable, any temporally prior 
variable is allowed to figure in its structural equation. Since C is the sole variable 
prior to D, we recover, using the Maudlin-recipe, the same equation for D as before: 
D = C 
But E is now allowed to functionally depend on both C and D. That means that, for 
each of the four ways of assigning values to C and D, we need to determine a result-
ing value for E. So consider the case C = x and D = y. Focus on the state of the 
world at the time that C concerns. Make local changes, sufficient to guarantee that C 
= x.  (If C = x in actuality, no changes will be necessary.) Evolve the resulting state 
forward until the time that D concerns. Make local changes to this state, sufficient to guar-
antee that D = y. (Again, no changes may be necessary.) Evolve this newly modified 
state forward in time. Some value for E will result. That is the value that the struc-
tural equation for E should specify as output, when given as input the values C = x, 
D = y. 
Let’s test this approach. For the situation depicted in figure 1, the actual values C 
= 1, D = 1 obviously map to E = 1. Given the values C = 1, D = 0, we begin 
with the (actual) state in which both C and A fire, evolve forward into a state in 
which B doesn’t fire but D does, locally modify this state so that D does not fire (and B 
still doesn’t), evolve this state forward, and see that E does not fire. So, for C = 1, D 
= 0, we must have E = 0. It’s routine to check the other two cases: C = 0, D = 1 
gives us E = 1; C = 0, D = 0 gives us E = 1. More simply: 
E = 1 – C + CD 
Notice, finally, that the fact that this is the correct equation for E depends crucially 
on what variables are included in the model. Reintroduce B, for example, and the 
correct equation renders C irrelevant. That result, of course, is exactly as it should 
be. 
The generalization of this recipe is straightforward: Suppose we have some vari-
able X in some model M. If we have been scrupulous in our choice of variables, 
there will be a clear-cut distinction between those other variables in M that are tem-
porally prior to X, and those that are not. For each way of assigning values to the 
former variables, we can follow the ‘sequential updating’ variant of the Maudlin-
recipe to fix a resulting value for X. In this way, the fundamental laws, together with   Review: Making Things Happen   
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the actual history of the world, will fix a unique structural equation for X (in terms of 
the other variables in M). 
Now consider some variable C in M that is temporally prior to X. Consider the 
counterfactual situation in which C = c, arrived at by locally modifying the state of 
the world at the time that C concerns so as to make C = c, and evolving this state 
forward in time. This forward evolution will yield some assignment of values to all 
variables in the model: those that are temporally prior or concurrent with C will re-
ceive their actual values; the remaining variables may receive different values. What’s 
more, given our truth-conditions for structural equations, the value that X receives 
in this counterfactual situation must be the same as the value that the structural equa-
tion for X yields, when given as input the values that all the variables prior to X re-
ceive, in this counterfactual situation. It follows that the conditional  
if C = c, then X = x, 
evaluated by Woodward’s interventionist procedure (set C equal to c; update values 
of other variables in accordance with the model’s structural equations), must, regard-
less of the details of the model M, receive the same truth-value as the counterfactual 
“if C = c, then X = x”, when evaluated by the Maudlin-recipe. We have thus ar-
rived at truth-conditions for structural equations that are not only clear, but that also 
guarantee that what may seem to be model-relative truth-conditions for conditionals are 
in fact not model relative: Any model that assigns a conditional a truth-value will as-
sign it the same truth-value, and moreover will assign it the truth-value it ought to 
have (i.e., the truth-value determined by the Maudlin-recipe). 
We now have reasonably good answers to the two questions raised at the outset: 
What are variables? What are the truth-conditions for structural equations? If some-
thing like the view I have been recommending about variables and structural equa-
tions is correct, then it has an immediate theoretical payoff, for it shows that Wood-
ward’s conception of explanation, far from being inimical to—or even an alternative 
to—the view that laws of nature play an important role in explanation, in fact supports 
that view. For explanation consists in exhibiting invariant relationships of the sort 
that structural equations aim to capture, and laws of nature—understood, now, as 
the sorts of things that fundamental physics and fundamental physics alone aims to 
uncover—provide  an  essential  ontological  grounding  for  these  invariant  relation-
ships. The search for explanations is part and parcel of the search for laws—or per-
haps better, is part and parcel of the exploration of the nomological structure of the 
world, a structure it has in virtue of its fundamental laws. 
Having said this, Woodward’s trenchant criticisms of the still-widespread under-
standing  of  how  laws  figure  in  explanations—namely,  that  they  must  somehow   Review: Making Things Happen   
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“cover” the things to be explained in something like the way that the logical empiri-
cist deductive-nomological model described—still stand, as do his remarks that the 
special sciences, at least, have invariant relationships and not laws as their most im-
mediate target. On the view I’m suggesting, the only sorts of laws there are are fun-
damental laws, and their role in explanation, although absolutely essential, is unques-
tionably indirect. 
Finally, the view I have sketched about variables and structural equations—as 
vague as it no doubt is in many respects—at least adds enough clarity to yield some 
practical benefit, in the form of cautionary remarks about how to model specific 
situations. For I worry that Woodward’s discussion seriously underplays the mistakes 
one can easily fall into when constructing a model even for a very simple situation, 
and that avoiding these mistakes requires extremely close attention to the content of 
a particular assignment of variables, and of proposed equations relating them. To 
illustrate this point, I will rely on a classic example from the causation literature: 
Suzy First: Suzy, an expert rock-thrower with a taste for minor acts of destruc-
tion, throws a rock at a bottle. The rock hits the bottle, shattering it. Suzy’s friend 
Billy throws a rock at the bottle, too. He’s just as expert as she is, but a bit slower. 
Consequently, her rock gets there first; but if she hadn’t thrown it, the bottle would 
have shattered all the same, thanks to his throw. 
It is supposed to be a major achievement of structural equations approaches that 
they offer a powerful new technique for dealing with such a stubborn counterexam-
ple to so many counterfactual analyses of causation. In fact, they fail rather misera-
bly, and at a surprising stage: the causal models standardly offered as representations 
of cases like Suzy First are simply incorrect. I’ll consider one example, taken from 
Halpern & Pearl (2005); while Woodward does not explicitly consider this case, the 
analysis that follows is exactly what one would expect, given his preferred structural 
equations treatment of actual causation. 
Superficially, the model is quite elegant and simple; judging from various conver-
sations I’ve had, it is currently thought of as providing the canonical structural equa-
tions treatment of Suzy First. It makes use of just five variables: 
ST: has value 0 if Suzy does not throw; 1 if she does. 
BT: has value 0 if Billy does not throw; 1 if she does. 
SH: has value 0 if Suzy’s rock does not hit the bottle; 1 if it does. 
BH: has value 0 if Billy’s rock does not hit the bottle; 1 if it does. 
BS: has value 0 if the bottle does not shatter; 1 if it does. 
We should understand each of these variables as making implicit reference to a par-
ticular time. More specifically, let’s stipulate that Suzy throws at time 0, Billy throws   Review: Making Things Happen   
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at (slightly later) time 1, Suzy’s rock strikes the bottle at time 2, Billy’s rock would have 
struck the bottle at time 3 (i.e., if Suzy’s had not already done so), and the bottle is in 
a shattered state at time 4. So ST characterizes what Suzy is doing at time 0; BT 
what Billy is doing at time 1; SH what Suzy’s rock is doing at time 2; BH what 
Billy’s rock is doing at time 3; and BS the state of the bottle at time 4. What we wish 
to write down are structural equations that show that it is Suzy’s throw, and not 
Billy’s, that causes the bottle to be in a shattered state at time 4. 
This seems to be easy to do. Halpern and Pearl—and just about everyone else, as 
far as I can tell—find the following equations satisfactory: 
BS = BH + SH – BH•SH 
BH = BT(1 – SH) 
SH = ST 
Assuming these equations are correct, Woodward’s account of actual causation will 
judge Suzy’s throw to be a cause of the shattered state, by virtue of the conditional 
if (ST = 0 & BH = 0), then BS = 0 
For if imagine an intervention that sets ST to 0 and BH to 0, then the third equa-
tion tells us that SH will be 0; the second equation becomes irrelevant (since the in-
tervention breaks the connection between BH, on the one hand, and BT and SH, 
on the other); and the first equation tells us that BS will be 0. It’s also not too hard 
to confirm that his account will judge Billy’s throw not to be a cause of the shattered 
state (I’ll omit the details). 
Success? Not so fast. Let’s take a close look at what these equations mean. The 
third is unobjectionable: it says that Suzy’s rock will hit the bottle iff she throws it. 
Given that we only mean to be considering four options for the temporally prior 
variables BT and ST—she throws/doesn’t throw at just the time and with just the 
speed she does; he throws/doesn’t throw at just the time and with just the speed he 
does—this equation is perfectly correct. The first equation might also seem correct: 
for it says merely that the bottle will be in a shattered state iff at least one of the 
rocks hits it. Likewise the second, which says that Billy’s rock will hit the bottle iff he 
throws it, and Suzy’s rock hasn’t already hit it (for in that case, it won’t be there for 
his rock to hit). 
But now we should smell a rat. Look again, and closely, at the first two equa-
tions. The first strikes us as true in part because, when we envision a situation in 
which BH = 0 and SH = 0, we understand that BH = 0 because Billy’s rock isn’t 
thrown, and instead lies idle (we may suppose) in his hand. But the second strikes us 
as true in part because, when we envision a situation in which BT = 1 and SH = 1,   Review: Making Things Happen   
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we understand that BH = 0 because the bottle isn’t there to be hit. The model is simply 
trading on this ambiguity in the content of the claim “BH = 0”. Remove the ambi-
guity, and one or the other of the first two equations must be revised. 
Let’s work through this again, slowly and systematically, making explicit use of 
the  truth-conditions  for  structural  equations  spelled  out  above.  Those  truth-
conditions will straightforwardly vindicate the third equation. As for the second, we 
begin by observing that the variables that are candidates for figuring in the equation 
for BH are ST, BT, and SH, since these are the only variables temporally prior to 
BH. There are eight settings for these three variables that we need to consider. Fol-
lowing the sequential updating version of the Maudlin-recipe, we can immediately 
see that in any counterfactual situation in which ST = 1 and SH = 1, the bottle 
must be in a shattered state immediately after time 2 (so: before time 3). Forward 
evolution in accordance with the laws will give us a time-3 state of the world in 
which the bottle is still shattered; hence BH = 0, regardless of the value of BT—
provided we understand “BH = 0” as meaning simply that Billy’s rock fails to strike 
the bottle. (Shortly, we’ll see reasons to understand it differently.) That takes care of 
two of the eight cases. Suppose next that ST = 0 and SH = 0. Then, clearly, BH 
= 1 iff BT = 1. That takes care of two more cases. There are two more cases in 
which BT = 0, in both of which ST ≠ SH; it’s not clear what goes on with Suzy’s 
rock in those cases, but at any rate we can be sure that BH = 0, since Billy’s rock 
isn’t even thrown. Now to the two remaining cases: 
BT = 1, ST = 1, SH = 0. Here, the time-0 state of the world is just the actual 
state, and no local modifications are necessary until we reach time 2, at which point 
we need to adjust the state so that SH = 0. Now, just how exactly do we do this? 
What sort of “intervention” do we have in mind? If the claim “SH = 1” is supposed 
to mean that Suzy’s rock strikes the bottle in a certain way—namely, the way in 
which it actually strikes the bottle—and if “SH = 0” is supposed to be true iff “SH 
= 1” is false, then the problem is that there are far too many ways to locally modify 
the state so that SH = 0, and no principled way to choose among them. Worse: some 
of these modifications will yield forward evolutions in which the bottle is shattered, 
in which case we won’t get the result that, for this choice of values, the correct equa-
tion must yield BH = 1. For example, Suzy’s rock might strike the bottle in a rather 
different way from how it actually does, but still hard enough to break it. 
Well, can’t we just read “SH = 0” as saying that Suzy’s rock doesn’t strike the bottle? 
If so, it obviously doesn’t strike it in a different way! But that isn’t really any help, for 
we are still left with the mystery as to how to locally modify the state of the world, so   Review: Making Things Happen   
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as to secure the truth of this claim. More to the point, one way to effect this modifica-
tion is to have the bottle be in a shattered state before Suzy’s rock can strike it, whence 
forward evolution will give us the unwanted BH = 0, as before. How, exactly, are 
we supposed to rule out such a modification as illegitimate? 
As far as I can tell, the only clean, non-ad-hoc way to secure the desired result is 
to read “SH = 0” as meaning that Suzy’s rock is simply absent (absent, that is, from 
the neighborhood of the bottle—perhaps we should return it to Suzy’s hand…), at 
the relevant time. Let us so read it. Then granted: BH = 1. 
BT = 1, ST = 0, SH = 1. Here, the time-0 state of the world is one in which 
Suzy is not throwing, but, as in the actual world, Billy is preparing to throw. Forward 
evolve this state until time 1. Billy throws (so no local modifications to the state are 
necessary). Forward evolve the resulting state until time 2. Make local modifications, 
so that Suzy’s rock—which, remember, has been sitting in her hand—hits the bottle. 
Once again it’s not so clear how to proceed, since we haven’t said with enough speci-
ficity what the content of the claim “SH = 1” is. So let’s correct that oversight, by 
stipulating that this claim says that Suzy’s rock hits the bottle in just the way it does 
in the actual situation. Now we can proceed: the bottle breaks. Forward evolving, we 
see that Billy’s rock doesn’t strike the bottle. But it doesn’t follow that BH = 0—that 
depends, unsurprisingly, on what the precise content of this claim is. If we take our 
cue from the foregoing discussion of “SH = 0”, we will say that “BH = 0” is false 
in this situation, since Billy’s rock is not absent from the given region: it’s there all 
right, it’s just flying over scattered shards of bottle-glass. But presumably this is not 
what Halpern and Pearl have in mind. So let’s take it that “BH = 0” means simply 
that Billy’s rock doesn’t strike the bottle. Then granted: BH = 0. 
We’ve now secured the second of the three structural equations, albeit at some 
cost: we were forced, somewhat surprisingly, to treat “BH = 0” as not at all analo-
gous to “SH = 0”. As you may have guessed, there is worse trouble ahead. We run 
into it as soon as we try to write down an equation for BS. 
Consider the values BT = 1, ST = 0, SH = 0, BH = 0. What should be the 
corresponding value for BS? It should be BS = 0, we are told—after all, that we 
are describing a situation in which neither rock strikes the bottle. But having been 
alerted by the foregoing discussion, we can easily see how this response involves 
some sleight-of-hand. Let’s work through the case systematically, to pin down where 
the fallacy is lurking. 
For the given values of the ‘input’ variables, we start with a time-0 state locally 
modified from the actual state, so that Suzy does not throw. Evolve forward to time   Review: Making Things Happen   
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1. Billy throws (no modification necessary). Evolve forward to time 2. Suzy’s rock is 
absent from the region of the bottle (no modification necessary). Evolve forward to 
time 3. Billy’s rock is about to strike the bottle—and now we need to make local ad-
justments, so that it doesn’t. Not not NOT so that his rock is absent: we know how to 
do that (just change the world-state so that no rock is there, replacing it by air), and 
we know that forward evolution of such a modified state will yield a time-4 state in 
which the bottle is not shattered. But all this is entirely irrelevant, since we already 
know, from having thought through the equation for BH, that “BH = 0” had better 
not mean that Billy’s rock is absent from the region of the bottle (else that equation is 
simply incorrect); rather, it had better mean only that Billy’s rock—one way or an-
other—does not strike the bottle. And with that meaning, the instructions to locally 
modify the state of the world so that BH = 0 are simply too ambiguous: one way is 
to remove Billy’s rock, but another way is to change the state of the bottle from whole 
to shattered. These different modifications yield different forward evolutions—and 
different values for BS. So we cannot, after all, even write down a correct equation for 
BS. 
What is the root of the problem? The key is to recognize that at time 3, there are 
three distinct states of affairs that we will want the variable BH to represent. BH 
should have one value if Billy’s rock is simply absent from the region of the bottle 
(which is what will happen, if Billy doesn’t throw). It should have another value if 
Billy’s rock is striking the bottle (which is what will happen, if Billy throws but Suzy 
doesn’t). And it should have a third value if Billy’s rock is flying over scattered shards 
of bottle-glass (which is what will happen, if Billy and Suzy both throw). Let these 
values be 0, 1, and 2, respectively. As for SH, we will keep it two-valued: SH = 0 if 
Suzy’s rock is absent from the region of the bottle; SH = 1 if it strikes the bottle. 
Now we can apply the Maudlin-recipe cleanly; for we no longer are trying to make the 
single value BH = 0 do double duty, signifying that Billy’s rock is absent, when used 
in the equation for BS, but that Billy’s rock doesn’t strike the bottle, when derived 
using the equation for BH. The following equations result: 
BS = sign(SH + BH) 
BH = (SH + BT)BT 
SH = ST 
Now that we have a causal model that we need not feel ashamed of, do we at last 
get the right result—that Suzy’s throw, and not Billy’s, is a cause of the bottle’s shat-
tered state? That depends, of course on how one wishes to exploit structural equa-
tions in giving an account of causation. But it won’t be straightforward. One of the   Review: Making Things Happen   
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simplest approaches (the preliminary account favored by Woodward) is to look for a 
path from ST to BS, and ask whether BS depends on ST, if the values of vari-
ables off this path are held fixed. The only relevant path from ST to BS is ST-SH-
BS. The off-path variables have values BT = 1 and BH = 2. Either of two condi-
tionals could thus testify to ST’s causal status with respect to BS. But both of them 
are false: 
if (ST = 0 & BT = 1), then BS = 0 
if (ST = 0 & BH = 2), then BS = 0 
Suppose we had reported the actual value of BH this way: BH ≠ 1. Then we might 
think to confirm the causal standing of ST by means of the following conditional: 
if (ST = 0 & BH ≠ 1), then BS = 0 
This conditional can seem to be true, if what we have in mind as a situation in which 
BH ≠ 1 is a situation in which the bottle remains intact, but Billy’s rock somehow 
never reaches it. But, as soon as we take care to distinguish this situation from the 
situation in which Billy’s rock does not strike the bottle because the bottle is already shat-
tered, we expose this reasoning as fallacious. In fact, the correct causal model simply 
fails to assign a truth-value to this conditional. And that is because the antecedent is 
ambiguous. Disambiguated one way, we get the relevant but false conditional 
if (ST = 0 & BH = 2), then BS = 0 
Disambiguated the other way, we get the true but irrelevant conditional 
if (ST = 0 & BH = 0), then BS = 0 
There are, of course, other ways one might try to secure the intuitively correct 
judgments about the causal structure of Suzy First, within a structural-equations ap-
proach. Suffice it to say that none that I know of is without serious problems. At any 
rate, the main lesson I wish to drive home is different: the cavalier and sloppy treat-
ment of this kind of example within the structural equations literature seems to me 
to stem directly from the relaxed attitude that literature displays towards our two 
foundational questions. It is business that really needs to be attended to. 
The second bit of unfinished business alluded to above concerns the nature of 
the facts relevant to our causal and explanatory judgments. Woodward takes them to 
be exhausted by the sorts of facts captured by an adequate system of structural equa-
tions, but I’m not so sure, for two reasons. The first of these hearkens back to Suzy 
First: it seems to me that we ground our judgment that Suzy’s throw is a cause of the 
shattering and Billy’s is not in, roughly, the observation that the intrinsic character of the 
process connecting her throw to the shattering is of the right sort. If this is correct, it suggests   Review: Making Things Happen   
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that an adequate analysis of the causal structure of at least some situations must at-
tend to more than relations of counterfactual dependence. (See Hall 2004.)  
The second reason can be brought out by comparing the events depicted in fig-
ure 1 with those depicted in figure 3, a slight variant on figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
A natural, intuitive gloss on figure 1 is this: the firing of C causes the firing of E, 
and, at the same time, prevents A from being a cause of the firing of E. But the intui-
tive causal structure of figure 3 seems quite different: in particular, it does not seem 
right to say that the firing of C prevents the firing of E—let alone that it stops the 
non-firing of A from preventing the firing of E! Notice, however, that if we look just 
at the abstract patterns of counterfactual dependence, they are exactly the same as 
between figure 1 and figure 3. (This may be obvious; if not, take it as an exercise.) 
What would account, then, for the apparent difference in causal structure? Some 
authors (Hitchcock, Maudlin, and myself, for example) have recently speculated that 
one thing that matters to us is which values for variables count as default values—
very roughly, the value a variable will have if nothing interferes with the system in 
question. (Remember that in the discussion, above, of certain kinds of counterfactu-
als, we already saw the need to invoke some such distinction.) Now, like Woodward, 
I am wary about leaning too heavily on intuitions about cases. In fact, his attitude, 
expressed quite elegantly in the following passage, seems to be exactly right: 
 
My interest in this  section has been in showing how  the apparatus of directed 
graphs and a manipulationist approach to causation can be used to reconstruct 
commonsense  judgments  about  token-causal  relationships.  I  want  to  conclude, 
however, on a somewhat more skeptical note. If the discussion in this section has 
been successful, what it has accomplished is [to] successfully isolate facts about pat-
terns of counterfactual dependence, as revealed in hypothetical manipulations, that 
are  relevant  to  commonsense  token-causal  judgments  and  causal  distinctions. 
However, in at least some of the cases discussed above, it is controversial what the 
deliverances of common sense are and even more so whether (or even what it 
would mean to say that) such deliverances are “correct”. The suggestion I want to 
make is that to the extent that commonsense causal judgments are unclear, equivo-
cal, or disputed, it is better to focus directly on the patterns of counterfactual de-
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pendence that lie behind them—the patterns of counterfactual dependence are, as 
it were, the “objective core” that lies behind our particular causal judgments, and it 
is such patterns that are the real objects of scientific and practical interest. (p. 85) 
 
I take the lesson to be this: if we agree on the sorts of facts that our causal talk is 
aiming to get at, and agree on how, in a particular case, those facts are arranged, then 
any lingering disagreements about what causes what should be viewed as termino-
logical. In the present case, if we agree that the facts that matter are just the facts 
about abstract patterns of counterfactual dependence captured by structural equa-
tions, then we should view any disagreement about how to describe figures 1 and 3 
as a terminological quibble, and insist that in the only causally important respects, the 
structures depicted are exactly the same. But the fact that intuition recognizes a dif-
ference between these cases might lead us to a different verdict, which is that our 
causal talk aims to latch onto a richer structure than that given merely by the abstract 
patterns of counterfactual dependence. I see no deep threat here to a structural equa-
tions approach, especially since a distinction between default and deviant values can 
quite easily be accommodated within that approach. But I do think we should take it 
as a question for ongoing research what, over and above the facts captured by struc-
tural equations, might matter to us when we represent the world in causal terms. One 
of the many virtues of Woodward’s book is that it allows philosophically rich ques-
tions such as these to be posed in such sharp terms. 
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